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THE FuL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE IN CONFLICTS OF
WoRKBIEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
Fmw constitutional doctrines have been accorded more lip service by the Supreme
Court than the one which announces that the Court must not decide constitutional
issues unless decision of them is essential for disposal of the case.1 But while
the doctrine has not always prevented the Court from deciding constitutional
issues 'when it deemed best to do so, despite the availability of non-constitutional
grounds for the desired result in the specific case,2 the recent use of this practice
in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clappcr3 is particulary striking. A Vermont
corporation -with its principal place of business in Vermont, 'was engaged in
furnishing electric current in Vermont and in New Hampshire. The plaintiff's
intestate was a Vermont resident employed by the company in Vermont to
work as a lineman, with additional duties to make emergency repairs in the
company's system 'whenever and 'wherever necessary. While working upon
emergency repairs in New Hampshire, the plaintiff's intestate was electrocuted
by contact 'with live wires from which, it was alleged, the company had not
taken adequate precautions to protect him. The Vermont Workmen's Com-
pensation Act4 provided that the remedy thereunder was e%clusive, unless,
prior to injury, employer and employee elected not to be governed by it It
provided further, that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary prior
to injury, the act was to apply to Vermont employers and employees even
though the accident were to occur in another state, and that failure to file
an express stipulation to the contrary should constitute an election to be
governed by the statute and by the provision as to accidents in other states.
The New Hampshire Actu also gave employees the choice of electing its remedies
or those of the common law, but it permitted the election to be made after the
occurrence of injury. The company elected both compensation acts; and the
1. See Brandeis, J., in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 549 (1924).
See also Matthews, J., in Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113
U. S. 33, 39 (1884); cf. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 118 (1919); Mis-
souri Pacific Rr. Co. v. Boone, 270 U. S. 466 (1926); Zahn v. Board of Public
Works, 274 U. S. 325 (1927); Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164
(1927); Herkness v. Irion, 278 U. S. 92 (1928); Salomon v. State Tax Com-
mission, 278 U. S. 484 (1928). It should be noted that the above cases involve
consideration of the constitutionality of statutes; in the instant case there 'was
required the determination of the existence in the locs fori of rights created
by a statute of a foreign state.
2. See Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U. S. 274 (1928);
cf. Railroad Commission of California v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U. S. 145
(1929).
3. 286 U. S. 145 (1932).
4. VT. GEN. LAws (1917) §§ 5752-5831.
5. N. H. PUB. LAws (1926) c. 178, §§ 1-38.
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intestate, by his failure to dissent, was "presumed" to have elected the
Vermont Act in accordance with the Vermont statute. Since the employee
had no dependents entitled to compensation under the Vermont Act, the com-
pany's liability thereunder was limited approximately to the biurial expenses.
Plaintiff, a resident of New Hampshire, and the employee's next of kin, con-
sequently chose to sue the defendant in New Hampshire on the theory that
New Hampshire law governed the right of recovery, and elected, in accordance
with the New Hampshire Act, not the remedy of compensation, but rather the
remedy for wrongful death. Subsequent to the removal of the action to the
federal court for the district of New Hampshire, plaintiff obtained a judgment
for $4,000. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment 0
on the ground that, on principles of comity, and by the "better view" of the
conflict of laws, the Vermont statute and the contract of employment made
in Vermont subject to that statute, should have been accepted as a bar to the
prosecution of the action. But on rehearing, with the writer of the first opinion
now dissenting, the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment 7 on the ground that
the Vermont statute and contract could not be accepted as a bar because both
were repugnant to the "public policy" of New Hampshire as expressed in its
laws, although there was no New Hampshire decision on a similar situation.
In neither the district court nor the Circuit Court of Appeals were constitutional
issues raised. Both courts decided the controversy on common law principles
of comity and the conflict of laws.
After review by the Supreme Court on certiorari,8 Mr. Justice Stone, in a
separate opinion, urged that the case presented no constitutional issue; that
since the jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked solely on the ground of
diversity of citizenship, the Court was free to consider alleged errors of common
law and not simply errors with respect to federal questions; and that, in the
absence of a controlling decision by a New Hampshire court on the question in
issue, the Supreme Court could, and should, hold that the lower courts com-
mitted an error of common law in holding that on principles of comity and the
conflict of laws, the Vermont act and contract did not bar the wrongful death
action in New Hampshire. Yet, despite its awareness of this accurate and
available non-constitutional ground for decision,9 the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis, disregarded it entirely, and placed its decision
solely on the ground that the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal
Constitution compelled the New Hampshire courts and the -ederal district
courts there sitting to give effect to the Vermont statute and its incidence on
6. 51 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
7. 51 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
8. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U. S. 221 (1931).
9. It is reasonably certain that had the action been brought in a Vermont
court, the rights of the parties would have been governed by the Vermont
act. See note 1, supra. See Douthwright v. Champlin, 91 Conn. 524, 100 Atl.
97 (1917); Conflict of Laws Restatement (Am. L. Inst. 1928) §§ 439-440;
Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 47 L. Q. REV. 483;
cf. Slater v. Mexican National Ry. Co. 194 U. S. 120 (1904); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, (1914); Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N. H.
126, 155 Atl. 47 (1931). The following appears in a Rescript signed by Morris,
D. J., denying defendant's motion to dismiss the Writ of Attachment: "Actions
under the Employers' Liability Act in New Hampshire are based on tort not on
contract and the law of Vermont has no extra-territorial effect." Record, p. 25,
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the Vermont contract as a bar to the New Hampshire action. The choice was
clearly deliberate and the opinion was carefully phrased. To place the decision
on common law grounds would have been to permit state courts to differ and
adopt a contrary rule. Placing it on constitutional grounds compels the state
courts to comply and forestalls attempts to differ. Since the compensation acts
in the several states vary in many details, although not as widely as the New
Hampshire Act differs from that of Vermont or any other State, and since,
moreover, there are still some states with no compensation acts, the desire to
give to the compensation act of one state effective recognition in other states,
under appropriate circumstances, may be sufficient to justify the Court's method
of decision in the Clapper ease. But apparently the Court had more far-
sighted ends in view.
In the first place, the Court has attempted to remove workmen's compensation
from the categories of tort and contract, with all the hoary implications attend-
ing those concepts in municipal law and in the conflict of laws.10 According
workmen's compensation independent standing as a "statutory relation" mahes
for a more intelligent treatment of the program as a social and legal problem,
quite distinct from the case of an occasional accidental injury by one individual
to another.1  Secondly, the Court has attempted to localize legal relations, to
give to relations created in one state a legal status which should not be easily
subject to official impairment in other States. In this attempt, the Clappcr case
is not the first. While steadfastly refusing to become the final arbiter on all
questions in the conflict of laws, the Court, on other occasions, has by the due
process clause prevented states with no sufficient interest in the situation from
impairing rights or immunities created elsewhere.' 2 In the Clappcr case the
'ull faith and credit" clause serves the same purpose. And finally, the Court
has again refused to accept "public policy" as ground for refusing recognition
to relations created in another state, where, although the refusing state has no
pertinent interest in the situation involved, its "public policy" is said to be
impaired simply because it accords a different treatment to similar situations
created by it and in which it has the paramount interest.
While thus unnecessarily establishing constitutional limitations, the Court
carefully refrained from absolutism. It was at pains to point out that "we
have no occasion to consider whether, if the injured employee had been a resi-
dent of New Hampshire, or had been continuously employed there, or had left
dependents there, recovery might validly have been permitted under New
Hampshire law."' 3 Public policy of the State of the forum may require, and
the Constitution will not prevent the refusal to recognize relations created
abroad when the State has a policy which would really be affected by recog-
nition.1 4 But judgment is to be formed on the basis of the interest involved
10. Mr. Justice Brandeis attempted to do this in Washington v. Dawson &
Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1924). See Comment (1932) 41 Y,%LE L. J. 1037.
11. Cf. Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
12. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397 (1930); cf. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897); New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246
U. S. 357 (1918). See also Dodd, The Power of thc Supreze Court to Rcvicw
State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 H/Adv. L. REv. 533.
13. 286 U. S. 145, 163 f1932).
14. Cf. Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274 (1927); Union Trust
Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412 (1918).
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and not on the mere fact of difference between the laws of the two States.
In the Clapper case, as in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,1 5 it was difficult to find
any interest in the State of the forum which would be adversely affected by
recognition of the immunity claimed. The result reached in the actual con-
troversy is commendable and in accord with the weight of judicial opinion
irrespective of constitutional requirements. Adverse criticism of the Court's
unnecessary reliance-on constitutional limitations is disarmed, moreover, when
it is realized that in doing so the Court has not prejudged the merits of future
cases but has simply clarified the issues to which intelligent argument and
consideration should be directed.
THE RULE OF REASON AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVAT13 SUITS UNDER THE
SHERmAN ACT
PRIOR to the decisions -in the Standard Oil and Ameriican Tobacco Company
cases,1 section 7 of the Sherman Act,2 requiring that the defendants be engaged in
illegal activity, was satisfied by proof of any restraint of trade.3 Thereafter, the
rule of reason established the principle that there were degrees of restraint,
and only such combinations, acts, contracts, or agreements were illegal which
"operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting com-
petition or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or which either because
of their inherent nature or effect or because of the evident purpose of the acts,
etc., injuriously restrained trade." 4  But in order to determine degree of
restraint an outside frame of reference is necessary. The courts profess to
set up the injury to public interest as the measure and yet attempt to find
that measure by means of the subject to be measured.5 The rule of reason
defines an illegal interference with free competition as an injury to the public
interests, and defines an injury to the public interests as an undue restraint
of free competition. Instead of directly approaching the calculation of the
public interests, the law weighs the evidence on competitive conditions and
sets the boundaries of illegality by extracting therefrom an inference as to
15. Supra note 12.
1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S. 106 (1911). The rule was attacked
as unwise. See Watkins, Change in the Truswt Policy (1922) 35 HARv. L. REV. 815,
926; CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY (1931) 72.
2. 26. STAT. 210 (1890) § 7, as amended, 38 STAT. 731 (1914) § 4, 15 U. S. C.
§ 15 (1926). See note (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 503. For proof of damages, see
Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1035; Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 1163.
3. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899);
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906).
4. United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 179.
5. Cf. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291, 311 (1923): "The direct
result of the alleged conspiracy and combine not to sell to the exhibitor, there-
fore, was to put an end to his participation in business. . . It is difficult
to imagine how interstate trade could be more effectively restrained than by
suppressing it." See Frey & Son v. Welch Grape Juice Co. 240 Fed. 114
(C. C. A. 8th, 1917); Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2d,
1924); Ballard Oil Terminal Corp. v. Mexican Petroleum Corp. 28 F. (2d) 91
(C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
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the injury to the public interests. At the same time it extricates itself from
the vicious circle of its basic logic by adopting, as a frame of reference, an
imaginary condition of ideal free competition, instead of depending upon
factual proof of injury to the public.0 However, both the inference and the
extrication depend upon the validity of the premises of the antitrust act: that
free competition is identical with the welfare of the public interests.7
Since an imaginary condition of ideal free competition cannot provide a
definitive standard, the measuring of degree becomes a difficult task. When
a court is faced with the fact of injury to a competitor, and must determine
whether the operative facts causing the injury are illegal under the Sherman
Act, it apparently needs no other substantial criterion of such illegality than
the facts of the injury. The rule of reason itself is met by declaring a par-
ticular act or the conspiracy engendering it as unreasonable per se.8 This,
however, is to preserve the rule but to put it to no use.0
The case of Albert Pick-Barth Comzpany, Inc. v. Mitchcll Woodbury Cor-
porat ion' is a recent instance of such preservation without application. On
January 1, 1929, the Mitchell Woodbury Corporation, engaged in the wholesale
and retail trade in kitchen equipment throughout New England, found that
two of its most important executives had suddenly departed from its employ-
ment for positions with its leading and much stronger competitor, the Pic.-
Barth Company. They had taken with them a large part of the records, plans,
designs, and a list of customers. The aggrieved competitor instituted a suit
for treble damages under Section 7 of the Sherman Act, alleging a conspiracy
between the Pick-Barth Company and the two executives. The jury made special
findings to the effect that there was a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of
its interstate business, and to eliminate or restrict its competition; that plain-
tiff's business, a substantial factor in interstate trade, was injured in the
sum of $40,000. But the jury also found that the defendant's acquisition of
the plaintiff's business did not effect an unreasonable restraint of trade.11
6. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U. S. 392 (1927). But see Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931). Prosecutions
under the Clayton Act by the Federal Trade Commission require a direct
showing of injury to the public. Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S.
421 (1920). In common law proceedings, the public interest is professedly the
essential feature. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 373
(1911). See KEzm AND MAY, THE PuBLic CommL o0 BusINusS (1930).
7. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); Hamilton, Tho
Problem of Trust Reformn (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 179.
8. Supra note 5. For the same type of logic to show illegality per se, before
the Standard Oil case, see Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company v. American
Sugar Refining Co. 166 Fed. 254 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908). For the employment of
this device in public suits under the Act, see United States v. Trenton Potteries,
273 U. S. 392 (1927).
9. KXxtE AND MAY, op. cit. supra note 6; Note (1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 291.
10. 57 F. (2d) 96 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932). The complaint was held good on
demurrer. Mitchell Woodbury Corporation v. Albert Pick-Barth Co. 41 F.
(2d) 148, rev'g 36 F. (2d) 974 (D. C. Mass. 1929). The Court held that al-
though there was no allegation of injury to the public, the facts of the com-
plaint, if true, constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.




The Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, treated
the jury findings as indicating an unsuccessful attempt unreasonably to re-
strain trade. Nevertheless, since the attempt sprang out of a conspiracy, the
intent and purpose of which was unreasonably to restrain trade, the court
found a violation of the antitrust laws.12 Similar declarations of unreasonable-
ness per so have been made where the evidence showed predatory tactics, 13 a
combination fixing prices at which dealers must buy and sell,14 elimination of
competitors,15 or complete domination excluding new competition.O As far as
the character of proof and the valuation thereof are concerned, the situation
reverts to the conditions obtaining prior to the establishment of the rule of
reason.17 In fact, the courts sometimes ignore the language of the rule, and
put the issue in terms of legality or illegality;' 8 or talk simply of restraints,
combinations, and conspiracies, implying their illegality without qualifications. 10
It may well be that the nullification of the rule of reason is a matter of
no great concern. 20 But the essential weakness, which leads to its disuse, also
vitiates the effectiveness of antitrust legislation. These laws by their very
conception fail to furnish a direct approach to the evaluation of the public
interests. They fail to provide a definitive standard of measurement for that
purpose, but rely solely upon deduction from the premises of the laws as
applied to the facts of each case.21 That such a standard is too indefinite is
12. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905). Nash v. United
States, 229 U. S. 373, 378 (1913).
13. United Copper Securities ov. Amalgamated Copper Co. 232 Fed. 574
(C. C. A. 2d, 1916); but cf. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide Co. 15
F. (2d) 678 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) where the court said that the allegations if
true "showed ruthless and unscrupulous individual competition" not under the
prohibition of the Sherman Act.
14. American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 Fed. 77 (C. C. A. 2d,
1915); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
For a similar case before 1911 see Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 238 (1904).
15. Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U. S. 291 (1920); Hale v. Hatch &
North Coal Co., 204 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913). Similarly before 1911,
Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., supra note 8.
16. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931).
17. Supra note 9, and also comparisons pointed out in notes 14 and 15.
18. Eastman Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927); Frey & Son
v. Welch Grape Juice Co. 240 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); Victor Talking
Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921).
19. Noyes v. Parsons, 245 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), Ballard Oil
Terminal Corp. v. Mexican Petroleum Corp., 28 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
Especially interesting is Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U. S. 66 (1917). There the
trial was held before the Standard Oil case, and the appellate court felt that
a new trial was necessary since the instructions to the jury had not mentioned
reasonableness. But the Supreme Court declared that the rule of reason was
implicit in the previous cases which furnished the guides for the trial and
sustained the decision.
20. Supra note 2.
21. Since the act of conspiring itself, apart from the accomplishments of
the conspiracy, is illegal, then the reliance upon deduction must bear a heavy
load to justify the conclusion that the public interest have been damaged.
See note 12, supra.
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demonstrated by an instance where, prior to the inception of the rule of reason,
the same combination, previously held legal in a suit brought by the United
States, was declared illegal in a later suit brought by an injured competitor.--
The same anomalous result was reached after the rule of reason had become
established, in an instance where a combination which had been declared illegal
was subsequently considered lawful in another action.m
The need for a direct test of the public interests may be satisfied, as sug-
gested by the court in the instant case, by the utilization, as an index, of
enhancement of prices paid by the ultimate consumers.24 However, save in the
one case where a consumer sued,25 no serious investigation of the effect of the
monopoly or restraint upon price levels has been made; prices apparently
assume significance only as costs to the manufacturers and dealers who purvey
to the ultimate consuming public,20 and in many of the eases, the defendants
actually are selling at a lower price to the public but use higher prices solely
against the competitor.27 Since by terms of the Sherman Act, the illegal
element is the act of combining, restraining, conspiring or monopolizing, the
price levels are merely evidentiary facts, employed chiefly to measure damages
sustained by a particular agent of free competition.28 This use to which a
valuable index of the public interests has been devoted, can be justified only
upon the validity of the premises contained in the Sherman Act: ie., that the
public interests are identified with the existence of free competition. Those
premises are at present undergoing critical examination.2 9
22. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); Pennsylvania
Sugar Refining Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., supra note 8.
23. In United Copper Securities v. Amalgamated Copper Co., supra note
13, the court overruled a demurrer to the complaint. In 1921, the Anaconda
Copper Company and the Amalgamated were declared to be in legal combina-
tion since they did not control more than 22% of the industry. Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921).
24. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Reading Co. 226 U. S. 24 (1912); JENKS AND CLARK, TRusT PnOBsLt (1929)
80: "The actual effects of the trusts upon prices form certainly one of the
best tests of their usefulness or disadvantage to society." See JONES, THE
TRUST PRoBLEmi IN THE UNIED STATES (1921) cc. XI, XX. But cf. Ellis v.
Inman Poulsen & Co., 131 Fed. 182 (C. C. A. 9th, 1904); Frey & Son v.
Cudahy Packing Co. 256 U. S. 208 (1921).
25. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390 (1906).
26. JENKS AND CLARK, op. cit. supra, note 24; JONES op. cit. supra note 24;
KEazER AND MAY op. cit. supra, note 6; Handler, I2uzustriaZ 31crgcr3 and the
Antitrust Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 179. Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1035.
27. This was true in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R., 183 Fed. 548 (C. C. A. 2d,
1910) Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 58 (1904); Ballard Oil Terminal Corp.
-v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 28 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Eastman Kodah
Co. v. So. Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 360 (1927); Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (1931). Much of this activity comes during
price wars and of course the prices may later have been raised as far as the
public is concerned.
28. Straus v. Victor Machine Co. (attempt to remove a price cutter) and
-cases cited supr, note 15. But cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911).
29. Handler, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAwS, A SYMPOSIUMt (1932).
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It may be possible to make a more profitable use of price levels, even under
the operation of the Sherman Act, by redefining the public interests involved.
However, governmental price regulation in so far as we have it today, seems to
be based upon the theory that monopolies and restraints upon free competition
are inevitable in modern business. Such a theory is clearly repugnant to the
concepts underlying the antitrust laws. As a matter of fact, in one instance
where the incidence of laws representing each of these two social ideas fell
upon the same subject at the same time, the Supreme Court put aside the
operation of the antitrust laws and gave effect to the Interstate Commerce
Commission's powers of price regulation. In Keough v. Chicago and North-
western Railway Company,Se'a shipper sued a railroad combination, alleging
damages sustained by its price fixing activities. However, the rates in question
had been declared reasonable by the Commission. The Court declared that
there was an illegal combination under the Sherman Act, but since the plain-
tiff's measure of damages would have to be the difference between the rate
fixed and a reasonable one, and since the former rate had been declared reason-
able by the Commission, there could be no recovery. This case suggests the
possibilities of a course of social action which may relegate such actions as
are exemplified by the principal case to common law suits for unfair trade
practices.3 1 In this manner, the operation of public statutes might be devoted
directly to the public interests.
RIGHT OF ACCEPTING BANK UNDER LETTER OF CREDIT TO PREFEENC0 IN ASSETS
OF INSOLVENT ISSUING BANK
BARCLAYS Bank in London had agreed to accept drafts drawn upon it under
letters of credit issued by the Bank of United States, reimbursement to be
effected on the respective maturity dates by an adjustment of the account
between the two banks. The issuing bank in turn wias to be put in funds by the
applicants for credit. Prior to the maturity of three accepted drafts, the
issuing bank suspended payment. The buyers' covering funds for two drafts
were entrusted to the liquidator of the insolvent bank to be held in escrow
pending the determination of the acceptor's right thereto. As to the third
draft, a prepayment had been' made to the issuing bank before suspension. The
court, taking the position that the general creditors of the defunct bank 'would
"derive an unearned increment" if the assets distributable among them were
increased by the amount of the three drafts, held that the drawee was entitled
to a preference in the assets of the insolvent bank.1
A judgment as to the propriety of granting a preference to the accepting
bank may well depend upon the answer to two questions. (1) Was the buyer
purchasing the credit of the accepting bank? (2) If he were, did the in-
30. 260 U. S. 156 (1922). Cf. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley Rr. Co., supra, note
27, -where the rates set by the alleged combine had not been passed upon by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the court declared that the plaintiff
was not to be deprived of his remedy under the antittust laws. However, the
plaintiff transferred his action to that commission, whose decision in favor of
the plaintiff was upheld by the Supreme Court. 236 U. S. 412 (1915).
31. Supra notes 10 and 13.
1. Barclays Bank v. Bank of United States, 236 App. Div. 150, 258 N. Y.
Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1932).
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solvency of the intermediary issuing bank, and the consequent inability of
the intermediary to reimburse the accepting bank which in fact supplied what
the buyer bargained for, give the accepting bank a better claim to "indemnifica-
tion" than general creditors? The answer to neither, it will be noted, depends
exclusively (or principally) upon legal doctrine but rather upon a survey of
the entire transaction as one in which legal principles take their place alongside
of many other factors. It is of course generally true that if a manufacturer
sells merchandise on credit to a retailer who subsequently resells to a customer,
upon the insolvency of the retailer the manufacturer is not given a preference
over general creditors either as to the obligation of the customer or in the
assets in an amount equal to the purchase price paid by the customer. If the
credit of the accepting bank had been '"ought" by the issuing bank, i.e., taken
at its own risk to be paid for whether resold or not, the case would be similar
in many respects to the case of the merchandiser. But if the issuing bank, in
acting as intermediary between accepting bank and buyer, assumed no risk
except in connection with extending the accepting bank's credit at the buyer's
request, the situation is different. The absence of risk incident to purchase
and ownership is what opens the mind to the possibility of short circuiting
the intermediary and treating the sale as one between accepting bank and
buyer. If this view is adopted, then the purchase price paid to the intermediary
does not appear to be properly a part of the estate of the insolvent intermediary.
The instant ease is one in which the court adopted this view, and proceeded
in a not unfamiliar though unconventional way to give the preference.
The construction of a system of legal propositions which will account for
the decision, however, presents the difficulties inherent in so many cases in
which priorities are awarded.2 Where drafts have been drawn directly upon
the issuing bank, it has been held that upon its insolvency, the buyer
could himself take up the drafts supra protest and be released from all
obligation to the credit opening bank,3 and that a trust is impressed upon the
covering funds in favor of the draftholdersA The instant case may be viewed
as an extension of this doctrine, and an application of the trust theory to a
situation in which a correspondent is employed as drawee. While at first
such extension seems reasonable, it -will be seen that the factors making
equitable the result reached in those cases are absent. Implicit in those
decisions is a reluctance to expose the buyer to double liabilityG and an
intuition that the bank's dishonor of the drafts amounted to a failure of
consideration. 6 In the instant case, however, the drafts were honored, the
seller was paid, and the duty of the defendant to the buyer was fulfilled.2
2. Salzburger Bank v. Standard Oil Co., 173 Ga. 722, 161 S. E. 584 (1931);
Bryan v. Coconut Grove Bank and Trust Co., 101 Fla. 947, 132 So. 481 (1931),
petition for rehearing denied, 101 Fla. 965, 134 So. 229 (1931).
3. Except, of course, the amount of the bank's commission. Bank of United
States v. Seltzer, 233 App. Div. 225, 251 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dep't 1931),
noted in (1931) 31 CoL. L. Rnv. 1358; (1932) 41 YArx L. J. 468.
4. Greenough v. M unroe, 46 F. (2d) 537 (S. D. N. Y. 1931), aff'd, 53 F. (2d)
362 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. dm 284 U. S. 672 (1931).
5. The buyer would still be liable to the seller on the sales contract. FiNxEL-
STmN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF Co0IszERcIAL LwrTrS OF CREDrr (1930) 155, 150 note
31; Note (1926) 40 HARV. L. REv. 294; 3 W.LisTON, CoNTRnAcrs (1920) § 1922.
6. Leslie v. Bassett, 129 N. Y. 523, 29 N. E. 834 (1892).
7. The defendant's promise to the buyer was to arrange for the acceptance
and honoring of the seller's drafts. Its insolvency could not affect performance,
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Nor is it arguable that unless the covering funds are impressed with a trust
for the benefit of the drawee, the latter would have an action against the
buyer. The accepting bank had no transactions with the buyer who was not
a party to the draft. It relied solely upon the credit standing of the issuing
bank, and looked solely to it for reimbursement.8 The fact that such reim-
bursement was to be accomplished by debit entries in the defendant's account
in the drawee bank is strong evidence of the intent of the banks that their
normal relationship should be debtor and creditor.O It is difficult to see how
the intervening insolvency of the defendant can effect any change in the
nature of that relationship. The covering funds for tlie two drafts held in
escrow by the liquidator should properly be regarded as an asset of the closed
bank distributable in proportionate liquidation dividends among depositors
and general creditors, including Barclays Bank. Especially true is this in
the case of the third draft since the prepayment1 0 was commingled with the
general assets of the bank leaving no res upon which a trust can be impressed.11
Nor can a priority be upheld by regarding the issuing bank as a mere agent
of the drawee in collecting the covering funds from the buyer. For once
collection is made, the agency is displaced by a debtor-creditor relationship.12
since Barclays Bank had already accepted and owed a primary obligation to
the holders. N. I. L. § 62.
8. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. National City Bank, 20 F. (2d) 307 (C. 0. A.
2d, 1927), cert. den. 275 U. S. 497 (1927); Pan-American Bank and Trust
Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); Regis v. 1-6bort,
16 La. Ann. 224 (1861); of. Equitable Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 275
U. S. 359 (1928).
9. That a letter of credit does not create a trust, see Equitable Trust Co.
v. First National Bank, supra note 8; Kuehne v. Union Trust Co., 133 Mich.
602, 95 N. W. 715 (1903); Taussig v. Carnegie Trust Co., 156 App. Div. 519,
141 N. Y. Supp. 347 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 627, 107 N. E. 1080
(1914); Banner v. Johnston, L. R. 5 H. L. 157 (1871); Morgan v. Larivibre,
L. R. 7 H. L. 423 (1875); Ex parte Dever, In re Suse, 13 Q. B. D. 766 (1884).
But of. Miltenberger v. Cooke, 18 Wall. 421 (U. S. 1873); Sexton v. Fenstorer,
154 App. Div. 542, 139 N. Y. Supp. 811 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 213 N. Y. 641,
107 N. E. 1085 (1914); Payne Bros v. Burnett, 151 Tenn. 496, 269 S. W. 27
(1925).
10. Shawmut v. Bobrick, N. Y. L. J., July 25, 1931, at 2028 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
1931), aff'd, 235 App. Div. 665, 255 N. Y. Supp. 1014 (1st Dep't 1932). This
is the only American case involving a similar prepayment, and it was hold that
the bank was a trustee. However, the issuing and accepting banks were the
same, and the failure of consideration and double liability elements made the
result equitable. See notes 5 and 6, supra. The English cases are contra: In
re Gothenburg Commercial Co., 29 W. R. 358 (1881); In re Broad, Ex parto
Neck, 13 Q. B. D. 740 (1884). Allowance of interest by the bank for the
period of the prepayment, as was done in the third controversy of the prin-
cipal case, was considered inconsistent with a trust relationship. See Neidle
and Bishop, Commercial Letters of Credit: Effect of Suspensio of Issuing
Bank (1932) 32 CoI. L. REv. 1, 20, 21.
11. Townsend, Construwtive Trzusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 980. Cases are collected at 993, note 53.
12. Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co., 160 Atl. 60 (Conn. 1932), and cases
discussed therein. Additional cases are collected in Townsend, supra note 11,
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Moreover, the issuing bank's liability to the drawee on the agreement to re-
imburse is absolute and cannot be defeated by an intervening act or default
on the part of the buyer.13 The imposition of such absolute liability would
negative any concept of agency.
A possible justification for the creation of a preference may rest on the
equitable principle that a creditor is subrogated to the rights of his debtor
against a third person upon whom the burden of the debt should ultimately
fall.'4 But this would necessitate the implication that the letter of credit
is essentially a guaranty by the issuing bank of the obligations of the buyer
to the drawee, a theory which has been uniformly repudiated.13 The letter of
credit is based on credit alone, and not on principles of subrogation, surety-
ship, guaranty, or equitable liens. The use of legal post-rationalizations to
interpret what to bankers and merchants has been a simple debtor-creditor
relationship' 6 results only in confusion and obscures the nature of the com-
mercial transaction.
APPEAL BY ComImiissioNER FROm DECISION OF BOARD OF TAX APPFLS
TH political dogma of the separation of powers has resulted, since the time
of Hayburn's case,1 in the doctrine that constitutional courts created under
Article TI of the Constitution may not perform functions which are purely
administrative or legislative in character or render advisory opinions.2  On
the basis of this doctrine it has been contended in the Sixth Circuit that a
at 989 notes 35, 36; Bogert, Failed Banks, Collection Items, and Trust Preferences
(1931) 29 MICH. L. Rnv. 545, 548 note 6; 549 note 7; 552 note 12. Contra:
Id. at 549 note 8; 551 note 11. See also (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 627; (1931) 31
COL. L. REv. 1039; (1932) 27 ILI. L. REv. 199.
13. It is well settled that where the issuing bank is likewise the acceptor,
its liability to the drawer is absolute. FINKELSTEIN, op. cit. S upra, note 5, at
250. Cases collected at 250 note 58; 251 notes 59, 60. MeCurdy, Cwnmrcial
Letters of Credit (1922) 35 HARv. L. Rnv. 539, 715. Cases collected at 732
notes 182, 183, 184. It would seem by analogy that the liability would likewise
be absolute when it is owed to an intermediary, the drawee bank. The problem,
however, has never been before the courts.
14. SHELDON, SUBROGATION (2d ed. 1893) § 167.
15. In Sexton v. Fensterer, supra, note 9, the court held that upon the in-
solvency of the issuing bank, the drawee becomes subrogated to the former's
rights against the buyer. The decision was based upon the erroneous premise
that the issuing -bank was a guarantor of the obligation of the buyer to the
drawee. That the issuing bank is not a guarantor, see FINKELSTEIN, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 35, 36 note 27; McCurdy, supra, note 13, at 737-738 note 210.
16. WARD, WHEN THE ACCETING BANK FAILS, a paper delivered before
the Eighteenth National Foreign Trade Convention of the National Foreign
Trade Council, May 29, 1931.
1. 2 Dall. 409 (U. S. 1792).
2. United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (U. S. 1851); Gordon v. United
States, 2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1864); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261
U. S. 428 (1935); Postume Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693
(1927); Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50 (1884); Federal Radio Commissioner
v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930).
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federal constitutional court may not entertain a petition of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue for review of an adverse decision of the Board of Tax
Appeals,3 since conflict between the Commissioner and the Board is an official
dispute between administrative agencies in the same branch of the govern-
ment. This contention relies upon the premise that the Board is an adminis-
trative tribunal.4 It was further argued that since the Board is the depart-
mental superior of the Commissioner, its decision concluded the government
upon the litigated issues. Therefore no "case or controversy" was presented.
These arguments adopted by the dissent were, however, rejected by the ma-
jority, which held that Congress had properly provided for review of decisions
of the Board of Tax Appeals upon petition of the Commissioner as well as the
taxpayer; 5 and that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the cause.
Even though the Board be considered an administrative tribunal, it is clear
that the lower federal courts could still review its decisions. The Supreme
Court alone lacks power of direct review of administrative findings, because of
the restriction upon its powers of original jurisdiction to the instances enu-
merated in the Constitution.6 This limitation upon the Supreme Court's juris-
diction excludes direct review of the decision of an administrative tribunal
because such review is considered an exercise of original jurisdiction.7 But it
has never been suggested that the lower federal courts were subject to the
infirmity peculiar to the Supreme Court. Nor can it be maintained that be-
cause of the Board's adverse decision, the Government has relinquished its
claim against the taxpayer.8 The Government's representative in the litigation
3. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 59 F.
(.d) 320 (C. C. A. 6th, May 12, 1932); expressly followed in Commissioner
v. Keller, 59 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 7th, June 14, 1932). Of the 303 appeals
taken to the several circuits from the Board of Tax Appeals in 1931, 64 wore
filed by the Government. Rn'. Ar'Y GnN. 1931 at 53; cf. the 35 appeal cases
taken by the Commissioner to the Circuit courts cited by the majority opinion
at 322.
4. Of. Commissioner v. Isaac Winkler & Bro. Company, 53 F. (2d) 680,
584 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931) where it was suggested that if the Board of Tax
Appeals is an administrative body and decides a controversy in favor of the
taxpayer. " . . . then the government speaking by this highest administrative
body and the taxpayer are in accord, and no controversy remains. If so, then
this court cannot entertain a petition by the Commissioner to review the action
of the Board." But of. Sm. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 32; CON-
FERENCE REPORT No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 46.
5. Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 110, § 1003 (a), 26 U. S. C. § 1226 (a)
(1926), which grants to the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia "exclusive jurisdiction to review the decisions of
the board; and the judgment of any such court shall be final, except that it
shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States upon
certiorari, in the manner provided in section 347 of Title 28." Of. H. R. REP.
No. 2, 70th Congress, 1st Sess., at 30.
6. Cf. Katz, Federal Constitutional Courts (1930) 43 HAIv L. REV. 894,
92o.
7. Ibid.
8. Cf. the analogous appellate procedure providing for the collection of
customs revenue, Act of June 10, 1890, c. 407 §§ 14, 15, 26 STAT. 131, 137-138,
19 U. S. C. § 402 (1926), by which the Customs Collector was given the right
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is the Commissioner and not the Board. The Board is no more a party to the
controversy than is an inferior Court in which the Government prosecutes a
claim. 9
However, the Board of Tax Appeals is neither a court nor an administrative
body.' 0 By Congressional design the Board was intended to be an intermediate,
appellate tribunal-a buffer between the executive branch of the Government
(the Treasury Department) and the federal constitutional courts.1 ' The Board
"constitutes an impartial tribunal of experts independent of the Treasury De-
partment,"'12 whose sole function consists in reviewing on appeal certain
determinations of the Commissioner under the revenue laws.' 3 The Board is
not "created for the purpose of reviewing the rulings made by the Commissioner,"
but exists "to determine the correctness of the deficiencies as found by the
Commissioner." 14 Nor may it be a party to "closing agreements" with a tax-
payer15 or arrange for "compromises"'1 since it may take no part in the field
work of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
of appeal to the circuit courts from an adverse decision of the Board of General
Appraisers. With an appellate procedure identical to that with which the
instant case is concerned, it was never suggested that the federal courts were
without power to entertain a petition of review from the Collector; or that
because the Board of General Appraisers had acted favorably to the importer,
adverse parties were not before the court. United States v. Klingenberg, 153
U. S. 93 (1894); United States v. Passavant, 169 U. S. 16 (1898).
9. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S. 716, 724 (1929).
10. The opinion in Federal Radio Commissioner v. General Electric Co., supra
note 2, suggests that the Supreme Court does not construe the Board as an
administrative body. While the question there was held to be "purely admin-
istrative," such proceedings were, nevertheless, wholly unlike proceedings under
the Revenue Act of 1926 "on a petition for a review of a decision of the Board
of Tax Appeals,'--a distinction which the dissenting opinion conveniently over-
looked.
11. Cf. FRANKFURTE & LANDIS, THE Busin=ss oF THE Supnmm Couirn
(1927) 186. That Congress may establish an appellate tribunal, which, -while
not a court, exercises judicial functions, would seem beyond scrutiny. EX parto
Bakelite Corp., 279 U. S. 438, 451 (1929). Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 52 Sup. CL
285, 292 (1932). In at least two cases Congress' power to establish the Board
of Tax Appeals as a body with "appellate powers which are judicial in char-
acter," although "not a court," has been sustained. Blair v. Oesterlein Co.,
275 U. S. 220, 227 (1927); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U. S.
716, 725 (1929).
12. SEN. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 34; H. R. REP. No. 1, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 17.
13. Williamsport Wire & Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 564
(1928).
14. Appeal of Robert P. Hyams Coal Co., 1 B. T. A. 217 (1924); Appeal
of B. T. Todd, 1 B. T. A. 762 (1925); Appeal of Gutterman Strauss Co., 1
B. T. A. 243 (1924). As to the finality of the Commissioner's determinations,
cf. Magill, Findaity of the Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue (1930) 8 THE NATIONAL INCO~m TAx MAGAZINE 135, 138; Id. 28 COL.
L. REv. (1928) 563. But cf. DicmNsoN, ADMinIST-Ainn JUSTiCE AND TH33
SUPREiACY OF THE LAw (1927) 269.
15. Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 874 § 606 (a).
16. 15 STAT. 166 (1868), 26 U. S. C. § 158 (1926).
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It may be inferred from the absence of legislative and administrative powers,
characteristic of such administrative bodies as the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission 17 and the Federal Trade Commission,' 8 that Congress did not envisage
the Board as a similar administrative tribunal. The Board is without express
power to reconsider a determination once finally reached; to grant a new trial
for errors, of law or fact, or upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. 19
Likewise, it was not Congressional intent to regard the Board as an investigative
body.20 The framers of the Revenue Acts intended its decisions to be "judicial
and not legislative or administrative determinations. '21
The majority opinion in the instant case takes a realistic view of this
peculiar status and function of the Board of Tax Appeals. It refuses to follow
the approach of the dissent in denominating the Board an "administrative
body" for want of an accepted category in which to place it; an attitude which
would have sacrificed a sensible procedure giving taxpayer and government equal
powers of appeal to the constitutional courts.
22
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS IN CASES ARISING UNDER FEERAL
ANTI-TRUST LAWS
JURISDICTION of actions arising under the federal anti-trust laws1 has been in
general denied to state courts.2 Section 256 of the Judicial Code expressly
reserves to federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of all criminal actions arising
17. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1926). For the
more important enactments amending or supplementing the original legislation,
Cf. 1 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) note 3 at 11,
and especially 3-10.
18. 38 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 46 (1926).
19. Cf. the power conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission and
the Federal Trade Commission to hold new hearings, to "set aside . . . any
report or any order made or issued by it." 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §
45 (1926). In this sense the Board of Tax Appeals may be compared with
boards of equalization set up by various state legislatures to pass upon the
action of local tax assessors. The general rule of law holds that "if the statute
makes no provision for a new trial or rehearing, the officer or board cannot
grant one." State v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 21 Nev. 172, 26 Pac. 225 (1891);
People v. Schenectady Co., 35 Barb. 408 (N. Y. 1861); People ex. re. Burhans
v. Supervisors, 32 Hun. 607, 611 (N. Y. 1884); Hyman, New Trials and Re-
hearings in the Board of Tax Appeals (1932) 10 THE NATIONAL INCOME TAX
MAGAZINE 321, 324.
20. 'A recent decision by the circuit court of appeals for the seventh circuit
indicates that there is some disposition to regard the Board of Tax Appeals
as an investigative rather than a judicial body .... The Committee is of the
opinion that the Board's function is purely judicial." H. R. REP. No. 2, 70th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 30-31.
21. Id. at 20; Cf. also 65 CONG. REC. 8391 (1924) remarks of Senator
Jones (N.M.).
22. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, supra note 11, and Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
1037, 1054.
1. Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7 (1926),
and Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
2. See infra, notes 7 and 8.
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under the laws of the United States,3 which of course includes criminal prose-
cutions authorized by the anti-trust laws. But the wording of these statutes
leaves some doubt as to whether state courts may have concurrent jurisdiction
of civil actions arising under them. It has been generalized that in civil actions
under federal statutes not exclusively reserved to the jurisdiction of federal
courts either by the Judicial Code or by the statute itself, the state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction.4 This was held to be true, for example, in the case
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 5 which, as at first drawn, was silent
as to courts in -which it -was to be enforced. The case of the anti-trust laws,
however, is somewhat different. The Sherman Act, for example, provides that,
"The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction
to prevent and restrain violations of (this act)."' Although this conferring
of jurisdiction is not in words exclusive, the Supreme Court has held that a
suit to enjoin violations of the Act may be maintained only in a federal court;7
and such suits have been dismissed repeatedly by state courts for want of
jurisdiction.8 The Clayton Act enlarges upon the Sherman Act by providing
threefold damages for any injury sustained by reason of anything forbidden
by the anti-trust laws, but uses the same wording as to courts in which suits
may be brought.9 An action for three-fold damages, therefore, by the same
reasoning and authority, may be brought only in a federal court.10
In the recent case of Hand v. Kanzsas City Southcrm Ry.,"1 however, the
petitioner, acting on behalf of himself and other stockholders similarly situated,
sued in the Supreme Court of New York for an accounting by directors of the
corporation for losses occasioned by alleged breaches of trust growing out of
violations of the federal anti-trust laws. The action was removed to the federal
district court by the defendants on the ground that the controversy involved
3. Judicial Code § 256, as amended, 36 STAT. 1160 (1911), as amended, 28
U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
4. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912) (based upon Act of April 22, 1908). The Employers'
Liability Act was later amended expressly to confer concurrent jurisdiction
on state courts and prohibit removals. Act of April 5, 1910.
5. Second Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 4.
6. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 4 (1926).
7. General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., 260 U. S. 261 (1922).
8. Codman v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry., 253 Mass. 144, 148
N. E. 467 (1925); State v. Associated Press, 159 Mo. 410, 60 S. W. 91 (1901);
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 121 App. Div. 443, 106 N. Y. Supp. 115 (2d
Dep't 1907), aff', 195 N. Y. 565, 88 N. E. 289 (1909); Venner v. New York
Central Ry., 94 Misc. 671, 158 N. Y. Supp. 602 (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd, 177 App.
Div. 296, 164 N. Y. Supp. 626 (2d Dep't 1917), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 583, 123
N. E. 893 (1919), cert. den 249 U. S. 617 (1919); Barns v. Dairyman's League,
220 App. Div. 624, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294 (4th Dep't 1927); McMasters v. Ford
Motor Co., 114 S. C. 100, 103 S. E. 87 (1920); see American Refining Co. v.
Gasoline Co., 294 S. W. 967 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). But see First National Bank
v. Missouri Glass Co., 169 Mo. App. 374, 152 S. W. 378 (1912).
9. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1926).
10. See General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., supra note 7, at 287;
Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F. (2d) 426 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928).
11. 55 F. (2d) 712 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
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a substantial federal question. In the federal court the defendants moved to
dismiss on the ground that the state court, in which the suit was begun, did
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter. Plaintiff conceded that jurisdiction
over this action by the state court was essential to its retention by the federal
court, on the accepted principle that in cases removed from a state to a federal
court, the objection of want of jurisdiction in the state court may be maintained
after removal even though the federal court would have had original jurls-
diction. 12 However, the district court, after considering injunction and triple-
damage cases, affirmed jurisdiction in the state court and denied the motion
to dismiss.
This case followed and is identical on its essential facts with the case of
Guiterman v. Pennsylvanik Ry.,13 the only other case deciding the exact issue.
The earlier Supreme Court and state decisions denying jurisdiction to state
courts of actions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts for injunctions or three-
fold damages,' 4 were distinguished on the ground that the earlier suits prayed
for the specific remedies provided by the federal statutes, whereas the principal
cases merely sought an accounting from the directors for the specific losses
sustained by reason of alleged violations of the anti-trust laws. These federal
courts, it would appear, take the position that while state courts may take
cognizance of the substantive rights defined by these statutes, even though
jurisdiction is expressly conferred upon federal courts, they may not award
the specific remedies which the statutes provide, but must content themselves
with such remedies as are inherent in a court of equity. The distinction drawn
seems logically maintainable and the result in the instant case has some
support in earlier cases which have declared, obiter, that state courts may
construe and give effect to the federal anti-trust laws in order to determine the
validity of a contract upon which suit was brought.' 5
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CoMPuLsoRy CENTRAL FUNDS roR SAVING9 AND
CooPERATIvE BANIKS
ON March 2, 1932, two acts of the Massachusetts legislature' were approved,
creating for the term of five years a Mutual Savings Central Fund and a
Cooperative Central Bank. The purpose of the former corporation, which
comprises by compulsion all mutual savings banks within the state, is "to assist
such member banks when they are temporarily in need of cash, or hold invest-
12." Cain v. Commercial Publishing Co., 232 U. S. 124 (1913); Lambert
Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry., 258 U. S. 377 (1922); General Invest-
ment Co. v. Lake Shore Ry., supra note 7. The reasoning supporting this rule
appears to be that, in the absence of jurisdiction, the case is not legally before
the state court and therefore, logically, it cannot be removed from it, but must
instead be originated in the federal court. As a matter of practice no good
reason appears why the attempted removal should not be given the effect of
instituting the action originally in the federal court, giving it immediate juris-
diction. This, however, is not the accepted practice.
13. 48 F. (2d) 851 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
14. Notes 7 and 8, supra.
15. Consult MeMasters v. Ford Motor Co.; First National Bank v. Missouri
Glass Co., both supra, note 8.
1. MASS. ACTS (1932) cc. 44, 45.
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ments which cannot readily be liquidated, by making loans to them or any
of them, secured by the pledge of mortgages or other securities legally held
by such member banks." The officers and directors of the fund are to be
elected by the banks; capital is to be acquired by assessment upon each member,
not to exceed three per cent of its deposits; dividends are to be declared when
the surplus reaches fifteen per cent. The purpose of the Cooperative Central
Bank, which comprises, also by compulsion, all cooperative banks, or building
and loan associations, within the state, is "to promote the elasticity and flexi-
bility of the resources of the cooperative banks of the Commonwealth by
centralizing their reserve funds." Capital is to be supplied by requiring the
member banks to deposit with the central bank up to seventy-five per cent of
the reserves they must now maintain by state law; 2 dividends are to be de-
clared from earnings, as determined by officers and directors elected by the
members.3 In both statutes there are also included regulations for the prompt
payment of assessments and for the safe investment thereof.
While these acts were pending before the legislature, they were submitted
to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts for advisory opinions4 as to whether
they violated the provisions of either the due process or the impairment of
contracts clauses of the Constitution. The closest precedent on which the
court could rely was Noble State Bank v. Haskell,5 which upheld a Bank De-
posit Guaranty plan adopted by Oklahoma@ and subsequently enacted, with
modifications, in seven other western states.7 The purpose of that plan was
to guaranty the deposits in failed banks, and, by thus stimulating confidence in
the depositors of other banks, to minimize the number of suspensions. Its
method was to pool the resources of all the state banks through annual assess-
ments which varied, under the different acts, from one-twentieth of one per
cent to one per cent of average daily deposits.8 Special assessments were
2. Maintenance of a three percent reserve against deposits is required
of all cooperative banks under MASS. ACTS (1931) c. 146, § 1.
3. No bank may borrow in excess of its deposits unless such loan is secured
as required by the directors.
4. In re Opinion of the Justices, 181 N. E. 833 (1932); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 181 N. E. 836 (1932). The decision in the latter advisory opinion rests
wholly upon the former.
5. 219 U. S. 104 (1911). No precisely similar law has yet been passed,
though in New York there has been considerable agitation for a central fund
in which membership would be optional. At present there is only a working
agreement among the New York savings banks, providing for their mutual
assistance. See (1932) 13 SAVINGS BANK JOuRNAL, No. IV, 106, 112. Some con-
sideration has also been given to the possibility of mutual savings banks
joining the Federal Reserve System; see Busunrs WEEK (March 9, 1932) 13.
6. OKLA. Comrp. STAT. ANN., (Bunn, 1921) §§ 4162-4175.
7. Kansas passed its guaranty law in 1907, KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
c- 9, art. 2; Texas in 1910, TExAS REV. Cirv. CODU (Vernon 1928) art. 450;
Nebraska in 1911, NEB. ComnP. STAT. (1922) §§ 8024-8035; Mississippi in 1914,
Miss. CODE ANN. (Hemingway, 1917) §§ 3591-3605; South Dakota in 1915,
S. D. CoMP. LAws (1919) §§ 9005-9031; and North Dakota and Washington in
1917, N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1925) §§ 5220bl-5220b41, WASH. CoMP.
STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 3293-3312.
8. In all the states except Kansas and Washington the laws were compulsory.
In Texas the alternative of a Bond Security system was offered, whereby each
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levied when the funds were depleted by failures. 9 The history of the laws
in each state was the same. Oklahoma's experience may be taken as typical.
For thirteen years the system worked splendidly, and on March 1, 1920, the
guaranty fund had not only paid off its debts, but had accumulated $76,000
additional funds.10 During this period, however, there had been speculation,
high rates of interest, and wildcat banking, and after the great agricultural
deflation of 1920 the system disintegrated. Twenty-seven banks failed in 1921
and thirty-two in 1922.11 Deposits in state banks dropped from $160,000,000
to $78,000,000; the debts of the fund mounted to $7,500,000; and the interest
on the certificates of indebtedness issued was alone three times the current
assessments.12  On March 31, 1932 the law was repealed. During the fifteen
years of its existence it had cost the banks of Oklahoma $3,600,000 and there
was a deficit of almost $8,000,000.13 One hundred and seventy-seven state banks
had failed, two hundred and sixty-six had nationalized, and one hundred and
thirty-eight had consolidated with other banks.14 Only three hundred and
eighty-nine banks were thus left to assume the burdens of the law.15
When Nebraska's guaranty law had become similarly bankrupt, the legislature
provided for increased special assessments.1 Subsequently, suit was brought
by the Abie State Bank, seeking an injunction against the collection of one
of these. 17 The Nebraska Deposit Guaranty law had been declared constitu-
bank was required to furnish a surety bond in an amount equal to its capital
stock, for the protection of its own depositors. TEXAS REV. Civ. CODE (Vernon,
1928) art. 437.
9. For a concise summary of the provisions of each of the laws,; see (1925)
11 FEDERAL RESERV BULL TIN 626, 636. A similar plan had been attempted
in New York in 1829. LAws (1829) c. 94, but it was repealed in 1841 after
the deficit of the Safety Fund had mounted to $2,519,000; see Fairbank, The
Depositors Guaranty Fund in South Dakota, (1926) 50 CoMMIERCIAL WEST, No.
18, 20. Other attempts to accomplish the same purpose as the Deposit Guaranty
laws are embodied in the Double Liability of Bank Stockholders statutes, enacted
by the federal government and by all but ten of the states; see Comment (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 583.
10. Cooke, Bank Deposit Guaranty in Oklahoma, (1923) 38 Q. J. OF ECON.
108, 110.
11. Id. at 113.
12. (1929) 10 COMMERCE MONTHLY, No. 9, 12, 15.
18. Cooke, supra, note 10, at 117.
14. Fellows, Guaranty of Bank Deposit Laws in Oklahoma and Texas, (1926)
50 Co1 I.mIECIAmL WEST, No. 17, 10.
15. Ibid. "It is estimated that the total assessments paid by state banks
in Oklahoma between 1908 and 1920, amounted to thirty-six per cent of the
capital stock of such banks." Hitchens, The Guaranty of Bank Deposits, (1932)
12 BARRON's, No. 22, 20. The best articles on the history of the guaranty laws
in all eight states are: Butts, Guaranty of Bank Deposits in Eight States (1931)
3 Miss. L. J. 186; Robb, Guaranty of Bank Deposits (1930) 2 ENCYC. OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE 417; and Hitchens, supra.
16. NEB. CoMP. STAT. (1922) § 8028, as amended in 1923 (LAws (1923)
c. 191, § 26), whereby a special assessment of not more than one-half of
one per cent a year was to be levied if the fund should be reduced to less than
one per cent of the average of 'total daily deposits.
17. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S. 765 (1931). The challenged
assessment was one levied on December 15, 1928.
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tional in Shaflenberger v. First State Bank of Holstcin,18 a companion opinion
to Noble State Bank v. Haskell.19 But the court pointed out in the Abic State
iank case that a previous decision sustaining the law "cannot be regarded as
precluding a subsequent suit for the purpose of testing the validity of assess-
ments in the light of later actual experience." 2 0  During the progress of
the litigation, however, the Nebraska legislature had enacted another statute,
repealing the section under which the challenged assessment was made and
providing, in substance, for the liquidation of the guaranty fund.21 In the
light of this "modifying legislation" the court refused to grant the injunction
sought.22
There are obvious differences between the plan of the Massachusetts acts
and that of the Deposit Guaranty laws. In the first place, the Mutual Savings
Central Fund and the Cooperative Central Bank will attempt to prevent
failures by lending money to weakened banks before suspension, while the
Deposit Guaranty laws did not operate until after the banks had closed. Thus,
instead of relying on the psychological influence of advertising that "deposits
are guaranteed by the state,"2 3 the proposed legislation will be able to obviate
runs more directly. Moreover, under the provisions of both the Massachusetts
acts, the directors of the funds may select the banks to which loans are to be
made, and may regulate what security will be acceptable.2 The funds, there-
fore, will more easily be kept liquid. But the Massachusetts court had no
difficulty in affirming the constitutionality of the proposed acts, on grounds
similar to those advanced in the Noble State Bank case. To the questions
.concerned with the due process clause they replied that since neither bill was,
in their opinion, an "unreasonable exercise" of the police power, the provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment were not contravened; to the question as to the
impairment of contracts, they replied that since the relations between banks
and their depositors, so far as contractual in nature, are entered into subject
to the future proper exercise of the police power, neither bill impaired the
obligation of any contracts. In accordance with the dicta in the Abic State
Bank case, the justices added, however, that if the laws, in their practical
operation, should become arbitrary or confiscatory, their validity could then be
challenged.25
18. 219 U. S. 114 (1911).
19. 219 U. S. 104 (1911).
20. Abie State Bank v. Bryan, supra, note 17, at 772; Note (1931) 40 YATX
L. J. 11-01.
21. By the terms of the Depositors' Final Settlement Fund Act, NEB. ComP.
STAT. (1929) §§ 8-171 et seq., all the property of the Deposit Guaranty Fund
was turned over to the Final Settlement Fund, and an assessment of two-
tenths of one per cent a year was provided besides. Only depositors in banks
closed prior to the taking effect of the act are to be paid, and after ten years
the entire law is to be repealed.
22. Supra note 17, at 782, 784.
23. Despite prohibitions against advertisements which implied that the state
stood behind the guaranty funds, it is reported that such phrases -were used.
24. Although neither act explicitly provides that loans may be refused to
members, it is presumed that this is the case. The Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts so interpreted the acts in their advisory opinions. Supra note 4, at 835.
25. In re Opinion of the Justices, supra note 4, at 835.
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The effectiveness of the Massachusetts acts is less certain than their con-
stitutionality. The history of the Bank Deposit Guaranty laws shows that
the success of the recent enactments will depend wholly upon whethor the
mutual savings banks and the cooperative banks in Massachusetts are sufficiently
strong to keep the central funds solvent. To answer this question properly a
detailed examination of banking conditions in the state would have to be made.
It is generally admitted, however, that mutual savings banks are the most
efficiently regulated and the most competently managed of all banking in-
stitutions.26 Since 1920, when the great number of commercial bank sus-
pensions began, there have been but six failures among all mutual savings
banks,27 and even in this year, every active institution paid its regular divi-
dends.28 Moreover, the three per cent; assessment, if it is ever found necessary,
will yield $65,000,000,29 and since the surplus maintained by mutuals is large,90
there is little chance that any bank would have its capital seriously impaired
thereby.31 The situation with which the Cooperative Central Bank will have
to deal, however, is not nearly so encouraging. 82 It is possible that in order to
26. See: Mills, The Problems of Savings Banks, (1932) 12 BAIRON'S, No.
10. 5. Under the laws of Massachusetts they may not enter the field of invest-
ments until the risks have been minimized, and their mortgages, selected from
a vast field of borrowers, are restricted to less than sixty per cent of the value
of improved property and forty per cent of the value of unimproved property.
Total investments in mortgages may not exceed seventy per cent of their de-
posits. See MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 168, § 64.
27. One in Maryland, two in New Hampshire, one in Wisconsin, one in Maine
and two in Massachusetts. All the failures were small. See (1932) 13 ASSOCIA-
TION Naws BULLEIrN 93, 95; and Mills, supra note 26.
28. The average for all was 4.32 per cent. In Massachusetts the average
was 4.58 per cent. (1932) 13 ASSOCIATION Nmvs BULLErIN 93, 95. It is notable
also that while savings deposits in all other banking institutions decreased
during the past year, deposits in mutuals increased by $565,282,000, to a total
of $10,030,000,000. Individual deposit accounts in mutuals increased from
584,179 to a total of 13,354,671. (1932) SAVINGS BANK JOURNAL, No. IV, 55.
See also tables in (1932) 13 ASSOCIATION Nmvs BULLETIN 93.
29. Deposits in Massachusetts savings banks total $2,127,865,469. (1932)
13 ASSOCIATION NEws BULLETIN 93, 95.
30. On January 1, 1932, the average surplus in mutual savings banks
throughout the country was eleven per cent. (1932) 13 ASSOCIATION NEWS
BULLETIN 17.
31. The savings banks in Massachusetts not only favored this law but backed
it immediately. The first meeting of the directors took place on March 14,
and an initial assessment of three-twentieths of one per cent was levied, which
yielded over $3,000,000. BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 1932, p. 27. The Central
Fund prevented what appeared to be a serious run in Lowell, on April 29.
(1932) 13 SAVINGS BANK JOURNAL, No. IV, 151.
32. Eighty-seven per cent of the assets of all building and loan associations
are in mortgages, and it is probable that a great number of these are not of
the first order. (1932) 52 AmERICAN BUILDING ASSOCIATION Nmvs 316. More-
over, the number of families building homes has decreased from 491,000 in
1925 to 98,000 in 1931, and a major source of their revenue is thus cut off,
Id. at p. 292. Continually one hears of the increasing quantity of withdrawals
by stockholders, and the necessity which 643 building and loan associations
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fulfill its functions the central bank will have to lend to its members more
than the amount of their contributions and on the security of questionable
mortgages. In that case, the $12,000,00033 fund provided for under the act,
may prove insufficient, and further assessments may have to be levied upon
banks already too short of quick assets. The disastrous history of the Deposit
Guaranty laws would then be re-enacted and its lesson taught once more.
Lmrm REvIEw BY JuRy OF FINDINGS OF WORKLEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION
A MARYLAwD statute providing for a jury to review the facts upon appeals
from the decisions of the Industrial Accident Commission, but limiting review-
able facts to those found in the record or stipulation of the parties' was chal-
lenged in Thonws v. Pennsylvania Railroat42  Claimant based his objection to
the statute on the grounds "that a jury cannot be used in any other than the
familiar, customary manner, that it cannot be used for the purposes of a pure
appeal, but can be used only in a proceeding de novo;" and that the "use of a
jury with a restriction as to the source of the evidence to be reviewed" was
without precedent.
Had the legislature provided for a review of the record by twelve men acting
as a "tribunal" instead of as a "jury" probably no objection would have been
raised since neither the Maryland nor the. Federal constitution requires a jury.3
But the use of the term "jury" with its peculiar connotation led one of the
dissenting judges to insist that a "trial by jury" in which neither party could
introduce witnesses was an "unheard of situation." The majority, however,
refused to concede the existence of such unimpeached custom 4 or to recognize
it as a restriction upon legislative power. Accordingly, the validity of the
statutory proceeding was upheld.
The dissent bolstered its objection to the restricted use of a jury by main-
taining that "the claimant without counsel, inexperienced, possibly still suffer-
ing from the effects of disability and disease," might fail to prove vital facts
at the hearing before the commission. It then reasoned that since the statute
in question was susceptible of two interpretations, the legislature must have
have found of turning to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for loans
amounting to over $80,000,000 is some indication that many of them are no
longer able to borrow from the banks. N. Y. Times, October 5, 1932, at 29.
33. On October 1, 1931, the assets of all cooperative banks in Massachusetts
totalled $560,364,279. (1932) 52 AMEPiCAN BUILDING ASSOCIATION NEws 376.
1. AID. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 101, § 56; as amended by ACTS 1931,
c. 406.
2. 160 At. 793 (Md. 1932).
3. Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
Branch v. Indemnity Insurance Co., 156 Md. 482, 144 At. 69G (1929).
4. Twelve men acting as a "tribunal" are used for various purposes. They
assess property for taxation purposes. Baltimore City v. Hurlock 113 Md.
674, 684 78 AtI. 558, 562 (1910). In condemnation cases they make their own
investigation. Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 Gill. & J. 479, 489 (Md. 1839).
5. The statute provides that "the court shall submit to a jury any question
of fact disclosed by such record or stipulation involved in such case." MD. AcTs
1931, c. 406. The dissent contended that the legislature meant that only the
issues and not the facts were to be limited to those found in the record.
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intended to provide for the introduction of new evidence. But the danger of
thus prejudicing the claimant by permitting the introduction of evidence only
at the Commission hearing is outweighed by the fact that if a trial do novo
is granted on appeal the procedure becomes more complicated than that exist-
ing before the enactment of the compensation act. An essential purpose of such
acts is to provide simple and summary proceedings, free from the technicalities
and delays which often incumber ordinary civil actions.6
The states providing for a trial de novo on appeals from the commission's
decision are relatively few. 7 The prevailing and more satisfactory method
limits the court to a review of questions of law.8 Some courts have declined
to review even so-called "jurisdictional facts,"0 which are usually considered
questions of law, if there is any evidence to sustain the commission's ruling,'0
The use of the jury, restricted tQ the facts in the record, as provided by Mary-
land, appears to be a compromise between a trial de novo with a jury, and a
review on questions of law." Although this procedure may prevent the with-
6. See Hege & Co. v. Tomkins, 69 Ind. App. 273, 278, 121 N. E. 677, 679
(1919). Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 285, 204 S. W. 152, 161
(1918).
7. HAWAII REv. LAWS (1925) § 3641; Nun. Cop. STAT. (1929) § 48-137;
N. H. PUB. LAWS (1926). c. 178, § 7; PORTO Rico LAws (1931) No. '78, § 15;
T x. GEN. SEsS. LAWS (1931) c. 224, § 5; VT. GuN. LAWS (1917) § 5807; WASH.
SEsS. LAWS (1931) c. 90, § 6.
8. This method is provided by Aniz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1452;
CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 4749, § 67; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills,
1930) § 8179; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5252; DEL. LAWS (1917) c. 233, §
111; GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 3154 (59); IDAHO CoMP. STAT. (1919)
§ 6270; ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1930) c. 48, § 156; IND. ANN. STAT.
(Burns, 1926) § 9506; IOWA CODE (1931) § 1449; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930)
§ 4935; ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 55, § 40; MASS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 152,
§ 11; MiGH. Coip. LAWS (1929) § 8451; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3342; MONT.
LAws (1921) § 2959; N. Y. WORK. Comp. LAW (1922) § 23; N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) § 8081; OKLA. CoIp. STAT. ANN. (Harlow, 1931) § 13363; OnE.
CODE ANN. (1930) § 49-1312; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 77, § 872; R. 1.
GEN. LAWS (1923) c. 92, § 1243; S. D. CoMP. LAWS (1929) § 9489; UTAH COAP.
LAWS (1917) § 3148, as amended LAws 1921, § 3148; VA. CODE: ANN. (Michie,
1930) § 1887 (61); W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 23, art. 5, Wis. STAT. (1931) § 102.23.
9. A commission has no jurisdiction if the accident does not arise out of and
in the course of the employment. United States Casualty Co. v. Henson, 43 Ga.
App. 198, 158 S. E. 614 (1931). Similarly, a state commission has no juris-
diction over a claimant injured in interstate commerce. New York Central
Rr. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917).
10. Chiulla de Luca v. Board of Park Commissioners, 94 Conn. 7, 107 Atl.
611 (1919); Malky v. Kiskiminetas Valley Coal Co., 278 Pa. 552, 123 Atl. 505
(1924); Pigeon v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,, 216 Mass. 51, 102
N. E. 932 (1913); Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 556,
114 N. E. 1009 (1916). For a discussion of the difficulties encountered by the
Supreme Court in respect to jurisdictional facts under the FEDERAL LONaStioE-
MEN'S AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, 44 STAT. 1424, (1927) 33
U. S. C., §§ 901-950 (1926), see Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1037.
11. A similar procedure is in effect in Ohio. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1926)§§ 1465-90; see Colbert v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 182 N. E. 330 (Ohio
1932).
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holding of evidence at the original hearing, and may decrease the number of
appeals, it seems curious that the legislature in attempting to improve the
method of appeal in compensation cases did not dispense entirely with a review
of facts.
JUDGMENT BASED UPON DEcsIoN SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED AS A BArt To
FuuRE SuIT
IN 1922 X filed an original bill of interpleader in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, naming as claimants A and B, in order to determine the
ownership of money which X had collected as rentals from property left under
the will of Y. The court decided that under the will the property belonged to
A and therefore awarded the rents to him. Before an appeal by B was decided,
A brought a separate action in ejeetment to recover the real estate from which
the rents involved in the appeal had been derived. B's defense to the ejeetment
suit was that the question of ownership would necessarily be decided by the
court in the pending appeal of the rents action. The court sustained a demurrer
to this plea and gave judgment in ejectment for A, basing the judgment on
the lower court decision in the rents suit.1 Apparently under the impression
that the pending appeal would settle both suits, B did not appeal from the
ejeetment judgment. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia sub-
sequently reversed the decision in the rents suit, holding that B was entitled
to the property and rents under the will.2 B then in turn brought an action in
ejectment to recover the property.3 The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment
for B in the second ejectment suit, held that the first ejeetment suit stood as a
bar to any subsequent litigation between the parties on the same issue.4 Mr.
Justice Sutherland, speaking for the court, indicated that in such a case a
previous judgment, in this instance the first ejectment action, in a separate
suit and unappealed, would stand as a bar, regardless of the fact that it had
been based on another decision subsequently revered.5
Mr. Justice Cardozo in his dissenting opinionc took the position that the first
ejeetment suit and the rents suit were actually parts of one proceeding and
that when the first decree was reversed, the judgment in ejectment, which was
based directly upon it, should be considered as a proceeding in aid of execution
of the first decree. Therefore the court should restore to B what he has lost,
1. See Allen v. Reed, 54 F. (2d) 713 (1931).
2. In Allen v. Reed, 17 F. (2d) 666 (1927), the court decided that the true
construction of the will of Y was that he had died intestate as to the property
involved and that the real estate passed to his sole heir-at-law, B. Accordingly
the rents belonged to B and not A.
3. The trial court held that B was estopped by the first ejectment suit from
further litigation on this issue. The Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia, reversing this judgment in Allen v. Reed, smpra note 1, held that
where an ejectment action has been based on another decree which is later
reversed, the ejectment judgment falls with it and is not a bar.
4. Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932).
5. B's remedy was an appeal of the first ejectment suit. See Reed v. Allen,
286 U. S. 191 (1932); Butler v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 240 (1891).
6. Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932) (Justices Brandeis and Stone con-
curred with Mr. Justice Cardozo).
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under the familiar doctrine of restitution of property taken before reversal
of an erroneous judgment.7
A possible procedure different from that adopted by the litigants in this
case would have been to settle the entire question in one suit. The equity
court in the rents action might have passed title and decreed possession in its
decision allocating the rents.8 Certainly equity had jurisdiction of the rents
suit through the bill of interpleader brought by X, and once having obtained
this jurisdiction, there seems to be no reason why, if the bill of complaint of
A or B had prayed for such relief, the court could not have adjudged that title
lay in the successful claimant.9 Long and expensive litigation could have been
settled in one suit, and the parties would not have been left in their present
unsatisfactory condition, wherein B, according to the final interpretation of the
will, should receive the property,10 and A is in possession with a clear title.11
Again, the reversal of the judgment in the rents suit might have been con-
sidered as giving B a subsequently acquired title.12 Since an adjudication can
affect no claim which a party has had no opportunity to litigate, it is apparent
that no judgment or decree can prejudice rights subsequently acquired. 13 Thus
even though the title to property is once adjudicated, such adjudication would
not be binding as against a subsequently acquired title.14 When the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
in the rents suit, it decided that the rents belonged to B. But to decide this,
it was necessary to decide to whom the property was left under the will. The
7. Haebler v. Myers, 132 N. Y. 363, 30 N. E. 963 (1892); Ure v. Ure, 223
Ill. 454, 79 N. E. 153 (1906); 2 FREMIAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1108.
8. A fundamental rule of equity jurisdiction is that equity will not try title.
Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485 (1883); Fussell v. Gregg, 113 U. S. 550 (1885);
First Congregational Church v. Page, 257 Ill. 472, 100 N. E. 975 (1913). The
jury privilege in suits amounting to ejectment might prove an obstacle, but
once equity has obtained jurisdiction over a case, generally it will make a
complete settlement of the issues between the parties, even if necessary to try
title or grant possession. See cases cited in note 9, infra.
9. Camp v. Boyd, 229 U. S. 530 (1913); Irvine's Heirs v. MeRee, 24 Tenn.
554 (1845); Billings v. Mann, 156 Mass. 203, 30 N. E. 1136 (1892); West
Point Iron Co. v. Reymert, 45 N. Y. 703 (1871); Sears v. Scranton Trust Co.,
228 Pa. 126, 77 Atl. 423 (1910). If the matter be considered a question of
joinder and not simply of praying for additional relief, the liberal equity
joinder rules of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia would, it seems,
allow the joinder. See Rules, Supreme Court, District of Columbia, 1929,
equity rule 19; Gilbert v. Endowment Association, 10 App. D. C. 316, 336
(1897); Bailey v. District of Columbia, 9 App. D. C. 360 (1896) (consolida-
tion for trial of causes between the same parties growing out of the
same state of facts is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and
not appealable); cf. Peoples' Bank v. Saville, 25 App. D. C. 139 (1905), cart.
den. 201 U. S. 641 (1906).
10. See Allen v. Reed, supra note 2.
11. See Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191 (1932).
12. Cf. Allen v. Reed, supra note 1.
13. 2 FREMAN, op. cit. supre note 7, § 712; Wisconsin v. Torinus, 28 Minn.
175, 9 N. W. 725 (1881); Marks v. Stevens, 72 Okla. 186, 179 Pac. 7 (1918).
14. 2 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 7, § 714; Barrows v. Kindred, 71 U. S.
399 (1866).
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decision was that it passed to B. It could therefore be argued that by virtue
of that decision B had in effect acquired a new title, not in existence at the
time of the first ejectment suit, and that consequently the first ejectment judg-
ment did not constitute a bar.
In spite of the anomalous result reached in the principal ease, the formula
adopted by the Court sets out a rigid and convenient device whereby a court
can tell merely by glancing at the docket whether the suit which is pleaded in
bar is a separate action. Moreover, the rule apparently finds support in the
previous expressions of courts. 15 However, it is difficult to understand why a
litigant should be penalized, regardless of the merits of his case, simply be-
cause of his attorney's failure to conform to a rule so entirely at variance with
the accepted concepts of the nature of litigation. Since the alternative sug-
gestion of Mr. Justice Cardozo is dependent upon the premise that the rents
and the first ejectment action were but parts of one proceeding, it is subject
to the objection that it is often difficult to determine exactly when one suit is
so based upon another as to be a part thereof. However, the flexibility of such
a formula would be extremely advantageous, in the event that the question
were relegated to the discretion of the trial court. In this manner the denial
of a meritorious claim, by reversal upon a procedural point, could be avoided.
EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IN LEASE EXEMPTING LANDLORD nomr LABmTy
FOR NEGLIGENCE
IN Kirshenbaum v. GeneraZ Outdoor Advertising Compan?, the New York Court
of Appeals broadly construed a unique lease provision exempting the landlord
from all liability to his tenant for damages occasioned by the former's own
negligence. The provision was held to apply where injuries to the tenant's
merchandise by rain were due to leaks in the roof which had been inadequately
repaired by the landlord. The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff tenant
on the ground that the liability exemption provision completely absolved the
landlord from any duty to repair defects upon notice given; nor could the
plaintiff found his action on a theory of tortious misfeasance, since no "element
15. Regardless of the erroneous character of a judgment pleaded in bar,
it is nevertheless an estoppel as to any further litigation on the same issue.
Straus v. American Publishers' Association, 201 Fed. 306 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912),
appeal dismissed, 235 U. S. 716 (1914); Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 91,
77 Pac. 765 (1904); Colburn v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1860); Ladd v. Byrd, 113 N. C. 466, 18 S. E. 666 (1893). Thus where a bank
set up as an estoppel the decision of a federal court, based on a ruling of a
state court subsequently reversed, the judgment in the federal court was held
to be a bar to any further litigation on the same issue between the same
parties. Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U. S. 499 (1903). However, it is
not clear why the lower court, in the first ejectment action, refused to reserve
its decision pending the final determination of the rents appeal See Walz
v. Agricultural Insurance Co., 282 F. 646 (E. D. Mich. 1922); Eastern Building
and Loan Association v. Wellington, 103 F. 352 (C. C. S. C. 1900); Quinn v.
Monona County, 140 Iowa 105, 117 N. W. 1100 (1908).
1. 258 N. Y. 489, 180 N. E. 245 (1932).
NOTES1932]
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of misrepresentation" as to the sufficiency of the repairs upon which the tenant
relied was proved. 2
In the absence of a specific undertaking, the landlord is under no obligation
to his tenant to keep the premises in repair.3 However, where portions of the
premises are under the landlord's exclusive control, the duty is generally im-
posed upon him to use reasonable measures of care in their upkeep, so as not
to endanger the tenant's person or property.4  Even where the parties have
included broad exculpatory provisions relieving the landlord from liability for
damages caused by water, steam, and gas, the interpretation accorded such
stipulations by the courts has been to limit their effect to injuries resulting
from wear and tear, inherent defects, actions of the elements,6 or the negli-
gence of other occupants of the building.6 With but few exceptionsl these
clauses have not immunized the landlord from responsibility for his acts of
affirmative negligence,8 or for failure to repair after actual notice of the do-
fects.9 In the instant case it appeared that the landlord had exclusive control
of the roof by virtue of a reservation in the lease of the right to rent to a third
party.'0 While it seems plausible to infer, because of the exculpatory clause,
that the tenant could not recover for damage caused by the initial leakage, even
if due to the negligence of the landlord, it does not follow that the latter would
be permanently excused from the duty to repair defects in the roof over which
the tenant had no control, and to which the tenant might have access only by
the commission of a trespass.11 The court's construction of the provision so
2. The doctrine of gratuitous undertaking is often applied %to cases in which
the landlord assumes to act although under no contractual obligation to do so.
In most instances, liability does not attach for a nonfeasance, or for more
insufficiency of repair, but only for acts of negligence which have resulted in
injury because the tenant acted on the faith of their adequacy. Cairnos v.
Hillman Drug Co., 214 Ala. 545, 108 So. 362 (1926); Marks v. Nambil Realty
Co., 245 N. Y. 256, 157 N. E. 129 (1927); Note (1928) 5 N. Y. U. L. Q. 80;
Marston v. Frisbie, 168 App. Div. 666, 154 N. Y. Supp. 367 (1st Dop't 1915).
3. Briggs v. Pannaci, 106 N. J. L. 541, 150 Atl. 427 (1930); Barker v.
Findley, 136 Okla. 55, 275 Pac. 1054 (1929).
4. Perry v. Levy, 87 N. J. L. 670, 94 Atl. 569 (1915); Rauth v. Davenport,
60 Hun 70, 14 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1891).
5. Worthington v. Parker, 11 Daly 545 (N. Y. 1885); Kessler v. The Ansonia,
253 N. Y. 453, 171 N. E. 704 (1930); Levin v. Habitch, 45 Misc. 381, 90 N. Y.
Supp. 349 (1904); Unterberg v. Israel, 103 Misc. 675, 171 N. Y. Supp. 133
(1918).
6. Randolph v. Feist, 23 Misc. 650, 52 N. Y. Supp. 109 (1898).
7. The Massachusetts, Missouri, and Pennsylvania courts have inclined
towards a liberal construction of such exculpatory provisions. Fera v. Child,
115 Mass. 32 (1874); Tuttle Co. v. Phipps, 219 Mass. 474, 107 N. E. 354 (1914);
Gralnick v. Magid, 292 Mo. 391, 238 S. W. 132 (1922); Lerner v. Heicklon, 89
Pa. Super. Ct. 234 (1926) (release of landlord "from all loss of property how-
ever occurring" interpreted to excuse his own negligence); Rcso v. Finance Co.
of Penna., 21 Pa. Dist. Rep. 490 (1912) (exemption clause relieves landlord from
his agent's negligence).
8. Cases cited supra note 5.
9. Lowy & Feffer, Inc. v. Mor-Ro Realty Corp., 223 App. Div. 621, 229 N, Y.
Supp. 169 (1st Dep't 1928).
10. Supra note 1.
11. Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co., 7 P. (2d) 177 (Calif. 1932); LeVetto
v. Hardman Estate, 77 Wash. 320, 137 Pac. 454 (1914).
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as to relieve the landlord of all duty to repair is clearly inconsistent with the
doctrine imposing a duty of reasonable care in such circumstances.
In view of the fact that lessors invariably attempt to avoid unforeseen lia-
bility incident to the tenant's occupation of a building, the instant case is
significant in that it establishes a new standard of conduct by which the parties
may govern their actions. In refusing to impose a limit to the lessor's power
to contract out of responsibility, the court advanced the questionable reasoning
that parties to a private contract of lease are always free to deal with each
other at arms' length. 2 The result reached seems undesirable in that it totally
excludes from consideration the very real possibility of a disparity in the bargain-
ing power of the lessor and lessee.13
REvocATIOxN OF TENTATIVE TRusT BY INCoNSISTENT WILL
THE testator opened a savings account in his own name in trust for his sister.
Subsequently, he bequeathed his entire estate to his sister for life, and upon
her death, legacies to named persons. At the time of the testator's death, the
estate, if the deposit in trust were not included, was insufficient to pay the
legacies in full. The court, finding that it was the intention of the testator
to include the trust fund in the disposition of his estate by will, held that the
execution of the -will revoked the tentative trust created by the deliosit.1
12. The lease in question was drawn August 21, 1925, when, it is not un-
reasonable to assume, the increased value of property and leaseholds placed
the landlord in a superior bargaining position. Innumerable economic factors
and differences in the situations of the parties might constitute variables in
ability to bargain and deserve some consideration by the court. See Llewellyn,
What Price Contract (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 704, 732 n. 62.
13. It may be noted that "finely printed, verbose clauses" waiving the
tenant's right to jury trial have been held valid. Waterside Holding Corp.
v. Lask, 233 App. Div. 456, 253 N. Y. Supp. 183 (1st Dep't 1931). The danger
is apparent that exculpatory provisions of the broadest scope may be incor-
porated into leases without the tenant's knowledge.
1. In re Murray's Estate, 256 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Sur. Ct. 1932). Accord:
Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank, 73 Misc. 308, 130 N. Y. Supp. 810 (Sup. CL
1911), af'd, 147 App. Div. 937, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1148 (2d Dep't 1911) (will
provided for specific disposition of the funds on tentative trust); Walsh v.
Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Sup.
Ct. 1919), aff'd, 192 App. Div. 908, 182 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dep't 1920), aff'd,
233 N. Y. 512, 135 N. E. 897 (1922) (testatrix bequeathed her estate on the
basis of the moneys in trust); In re Beagan's Estate, 112 Misc. 292, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 941 (Sur. Ct. 1920) (testator had no other property than the bank account
in question out of which the legacies could have been satisfied); Moran v.
Ferchland, 113 Misc. 1, 184 N. Y. Supp. 428 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (will bequeathed
account in questi6n to another person); In re Richardson's Estate, 134 Misc.
174, 235 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Sur. Ct. 1929) (testimony of witnesses to execution
of will held admissible to show that testator intended disposition of moneys
in trust). But cf. Wait v. Society for Political Study of New York City, 68
Misc. 245, 123 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1910) (trust held to be effective as
against residuary clause in the will); Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Institu-
tion, 155 App. Div. 123, 139 N. 'Y. Supp. 986 (1st Dep't 1913) (revocation by
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The convenience of the savings bank trust as a method of disposing of com-
paratively small sums of money without the necessity of probate proceedings,
and the negligible danger of fraudulent claims, have induced the New York
courts to employ a complex rationalization in order to uphold its validity.2
Where a person deposits money in his own name in trust for another without
more,3 the presumption is that a valid trust was intended.4 An immediate
equitable interest is said to vest in the beneficiary,5 thereby divesting the trust
of its ambulatory character and eliminating the necessity of compliance with
the testamentary requirements.0 A power of revocation7 capable of being
exercised during the lifetime of the depositor by some decisive act or declara-
tion of disaffirmance, such as a withdrawal of the funds,8 is held to be impliedly
reserved.9 Instead of the death of the depositor being a condition precedent
to the existence of the trust, the trust is said to arise at the time of the deposit,
subject to defeasance by the exercise of the settlor's implied power of revo-
cation. The execution of a will inconsistent with the existence of the trust is
considered a sufficient act of disaffirmance.10 But, since a will is regarded as
will held ineffective where trust was made irrevocable by prior delivery of
passbook to beneficiary); Meehan v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 213
App. Div. 807, 208 N. Y. Supp. 325 (1st Dep't 1925), aff'd, 241 N. Yl 564,
150 N. E. 556 (1925) (trust held to be effective as against residuary clause in
the will); In re Brazil's Estate, 130 Misc. 299, 224 N. Y. Supp. 308 (Sur. Ct.
1927) (disposition by will held not to include: trust fund); Marshall v. Franklin
Society, 131 Misc. 611, 228 N. Y. Supp. 270 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd, 224 App.
Div. 834, 231 N. Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't 1928) (revocation by will held inef-
fective where testatrix transferred by formal document a deposit in her own
name to herself as trustee for a hospital and signed formal acceptance).
2. See Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills (1930) 43 HAnv. L. REV. 521.
3. In New Jersey, such trusts are held to be testamentary and therefore
invalid. Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N. J. Eq. 743, 61 AtI. 267 (1905), afl'd, 11 N. J.
Eq. 777, 71 Atl. 1135 (1907); see Scott, loc cit. supra note 2. The Massa-
chusetts courts require some act other than the bare deposit to establish a
trust. Clark v. Clark, 108 Mass. 522 (1871); Jewett v. Shattuck, 124 lass.
590 (1878); Parkman v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 151 Mass. 218, 24 N. E. 43
(1890); Cleveland v. Hampden Savings Bank, 182 lass. 110, 65 N. E. 27 (1902);
see Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits (1916) 1 CoNN.
L. Q. 159.
. 4. Matter of Totten, 179 N. Y. 112, 71 N. E. 748 (1904). This decision is
cited as the leading case on the New York doctrine of tentative trusts. For
an extensive study of the cases on savings bank trusts in New York, see Note
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1133. See BRADY, BANx DEPOSITS (1911) § 3 and cases
cited, at 6 n. 8.
5. In re King's Will, 51 Misc. 375, 101 N. Y. Supp. 279 (Sur. Ct. 19006). See
BRADY, op cit. supra, note 4, § 11.
6. Scott, loc. cit. supra note 2.
7. For a discussion of the effect of a power of revocation on the validity
of a trust, see 1, PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 97.
8. Tierney v. Fitzpatrick, 122 App. Div. 623, 107 N. Y. Supp. 527 (1st Dep't
1907), rev'd on another point, 195 N. Y. 433, 88 N. E. 750 (19009).
9. Matter of Totten, supra note 4.
10. Thomas v. Newburgh Savings Bank; Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial
Savings Bank; In re Beagan's Estate; Moran v. Ferchland; In re Richardson's
Estate; In re Murray's Estate, all suprat note 1.
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having no force until the death of the testator," the argument has been ad-
vanced that the revocation occurs upon the will's taking effect,12 leading to the
peculiar paradox of revocation taking place at the same moment the trust
becomes absolute, a highly confusing technicality. The New York courts evade
this situation by adhering to the proposition that the execution of the will
suffices as a means of revocation. It is interesting to speculate, although no
case has presented the problem, -whether the execution of an invalid vill would
effect a revocation. The reasoning of the New York decisions seems to suggest
an affirmative answer.
The court in the instant case, having held that the inconsistent will was capa-
ble of revoking the tentative trust,' 3 was confronted with the further problem
of determining whether the testator intended to exercise his power of revo-
cation by disposing of the funds in trust, the solution of which necessitated a
factual construction of the will. The fact that the legacies could not be satisfied
without the inclusion of the trust fund moved the court to conclude that the
testator must have so intended.14 A mere residuary bequest, however, will not
be construed by the New York courts as an indication of an intention to revoke
the tentative trust.15 That the tentative trust theory'0 is elaborate is the result
of reluctance on the part of the courts to graft exceptions upon fundamental
wills and trust principles; 17 nevertheless it furnishes a flexible device whereby
a disposition of an estate can be made in a manner which accords with the
intention of the depositor.
SEr-oFF op DEPosITs IN SAVINGS DEPARTMENT OF INSOLVENT BANK
THE courts of two jurisdictions, in each of which there is a statute providing
for the segregation of savings department assets, have recently taken widely
different positions as to the propriety of permitting customers of an insolvent
state bank, having both commercial and savings departments, to set off their
deposit balances against their obligations on notes held by the savings depart-
ment. In Bassett v. CJity Bank and Trust Co.,' the Connecticut Supreme Court
definitely threw the mantle of statutory protection around savings department
assets. It denied to depositors having either savings or commercial deposit
balances the right to set them off against notes which were originally discounted,
whether with or without the knowledge of the borrower, by the savings depart-
ment. It likewise denied set-offs against notes originally discounted by the
commercial department but subsequently transferred for value before maturity
11. 1 DAvIDS, NEw YoRK LAW OF WILLs (1923) § 7.
12. See Stockert v. Dry Dock Savings Institution, supra note 1, at 129, 139
N. Y. Supp. at 990..
13. In re Murray's Estate, supra note 1.
14. Id. at 817.
15. Wait v. Society for Political Study of New York City; Meehan v. Emi-
grant Industrial Savings Bank, both supra note 1.
16. For a criticism of the use of the word "tentative" as descriptive of the
trust, see Bogert, op. cit. supra note 3, at 171 n. 86.
17. For a criticism of the New York doctrine on the ground that it violates
both the theory of a trust and the policy of the statute of wills, see Larremore,
Judicial Legislation in New York (1905) 14 YALE L. T. 312, 315.
1. 115 Conn. 1, 160 Atl. 60 (1932).
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to the savings department without the maker's consent. These results wore
impelled by the court's interpretation of the statute2 requiring the segregation
of savings department assets. However, a set-off of a commercial deposit
was permitted where the note was transferred to the savings department, not
in exchange for assets, but to compensate for a depreciation in the value of that
department's security investments. It will be noted that in both situations in
which set-offs were denied, savings department funds had actually been invested
in the notes against which set-offs were sought. In Michigan, however, despite
statutory requirements 3 similar to those considered all persuasive in Connec-
ticut, the Supreme Court, by a 5 to 3 vote,4 permitted commercial depositors
to set off their balances against notes originally discounted by the commercial
department, but later transferred, prior to insolvency, to the trust depart-
ment. The court, using the case as a vehicle to state its views on the entire
problem, took the position that a set-off should be permitted irrespective of the
departments affected thereby.5
Two conflicting policies confront a court which is faced with the problem
of allowing a set-off. From the viewpoint of the administration of an insolvent
estate, the court is motivated to allow the set-off of mutual debits and credits
and so speed up the liquidation process. The legislative desire to give the most
complete protection possible to savings depositors supplies the contrary moti-
vation. The denial of a set-off may--where there are statutes providing for the
segregation of savings department assets6-be rationalized in either of two
ways. One is that the bank holds deposits in its savings department as trustee
for the benefit of its depositors as cestuis que trustent, but that loans made
by the department make the bank a creditor of the borrower.7 Hence, as the
capacities of the parties are different, the element of mutuality is lacking, and
set-offs must be denied. This is true whether the deposits are in the com-
mercials or in the savings9 department of the bank. It is of no importance
that the maker of the notes did not know the source of the funds.lo He may
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 3908.
3. MicH. COMP. LAWS (1929) § 11928 (savings department), § 12019 (trust
department).
4. Reichert v. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 257 Mich. 535, 242 N. W. 236
(1932).
5. Id. at 242 N. W. 238; see Reichert v. Farmers' & Workingmen's Savings
Bank, 257 Mich. 500, 242 N. W. 239, 244, 248 (1932) for a reiteration by the
majority of the court of this view.
6. ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 57, §§ 89-91; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 172,
§ 62; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) §§ 22-1102.
7. Lawrence v. Lincoln Trust Co., 123 Me. 273, 122 Atl. 765 (1923); Bach-
rach v. Allen, 239 Mass. 272, 131 N. E. 857 (1921); Dole v. Chattabriga, 82
N. H. 396, 134 Atl. 347 (1926).
8. Lawrence v. Lincoln Trust Co., supra note 7; Kelly v. Allen, 239 Mass.
298, 131 N. E. 855 (1921); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Rosenbush, 239 Mass.
305, 131 N. E. 858 (1921); Tremont Trust Co. v. Baker, 243 Mass. 530, 187
N. E. 915 (1923); Tremont Trust Co. v. C. H. Graham Furniture Co., 244 Mass.
134, 138 N. E. 330 (1923) ; Bailey v. Allen, 244 Mass. 499, 138 N. E. 915 (1923);
Dole v. Chattabriga, supra note 7.
9. Lawrence v. Lincoln Trust Co.; Bachrach v. Allen; Dole v. Chattabriga,
all supra note 7.




have borrowed originally from the commercial department and had his notes
transferred for value to the savings department." He may have agreed to
keep a deposit balance of 209 of the face of the note in the commercial depart-
ment 12 or have pledged his savings passbook 13 or commercial account 4 as
collateral. Even an independent contract between customer and bank for a
set-off is of no avail.1 Thus, despite the presence of any one or a combination
of these factors, the technical requirement of mutuality operates to deny set-offs.
The other rationalization has been employed by the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut.' 6 Savings depositors are regarded as equitable owners of the segre-
gated assets in which their deposits have been invested. As an equitable owner,
each has an equal right to share proportionately in all assets thus set aside.
Once such assets have in fact been invested, the rights of each depositor accrue.
His vested rights may not be impaired by permitting any borrower, whether
a savings depositor or not, to diminish the assets by way of set-off. But where
the department's assets are merely supplemented by a gratuitous transfer of
additional notes from another department to compensate for depreciated securi-
ties, the ordinary rules of set-off are applicable for the benefit of both savings
and commercial depositors, as the instant Connecticut case clearly indicates.
A further view 7 is that the statute18 requiring segregation of savings assets
does not give to savings depositors a lien, as it apparently does in Connecticut,
but merely provides rules of distribution and priority. Since the relation be-
tween bank and savings depositor, moreover, is construed to be that of debtor
and creditor, the depositor must be allowed a set-off.10 But a commercial
depositor may not set off his deposit balance as that would prefer him to the
savings depositors and give him a share of funds held primarily for them.20
In all jurisdictions savings depositors are allowed to set off their deposit
balances against notes held by the commercial department even though the
assets available for distribution to commercial depositors will thereby be
diminished.2 1 Since this will further the policy of preferring savings deposi-
tors who, in any event, may share ratably, to the etent their claims are not
11. Tremont Trust Co. v. C. H. Graham Furniture Co., supra note 8;
Bieringer-Hanauer Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 73, 141 N. E.
566 (1923); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 143
N. E. 827 (1924); Dole v. Chattabriga, supra note 7.
12. Tremont Trust Co. v. C. H. Graham Furniture Co., supra note 8.
13. Bassett v. Merchants Trust Co., 161 Atl. 785 (Conn. 1932).
14. Bailey v. Allen, upra note 8.
15. Tremont Trust Co. v. Baker, supra, note 8.
16. Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (1914).
17. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100; modified on rehearing,
105 Ore. 618, 210 Pac. 706 (1922).
18. ORE. L. §6220, as amended by c. 217, LAWs of 1921. This section, as
modified, is now ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 22-1102.
19. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100 (1922).
20. Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 618, 210 Pac. 706 (1922).
21. Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 16; Reichert v. Farmers'
& Workingmen's Savings Bank, supra note 5; Williams v. Johnson, 50 Mont.
7, 144 Pac. 768 (1914); Upham v. Bramwell, supra note 17. Quacre whether
Oregon would still achieve this result in view of the statute, On&. CODD ANN.
(1930) § 22-2003, giving commercial depositors a prior lien on the assets of
the commercial department.
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met out of savings department assets, with commercial depositors in the com-
mercial department assets, the courts are quite willing to reach this xesult.22
The Michigan court stands alone in permitting inter-departmental set-offs in
every situation. Ignoring the statute found to be controlling by the courts
of most jurisdictions, its decision seems to run counter to the expressed policy
of its own legislature and to the judicial policy of other states in which the
matter has been adjudicated.
22. See Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 881 for an extensive study of the
considerations involved in allowing commercial depositors to set off their bal-
ances against notes held by the commercial department.
